19 November 2011

"Thinking, Fast and Slow" by Daniel Kahneman (2011)

In the book's first four parts, the catalogue of behavioural biases poses no intellectual challenge, in the same manner as one's inability to read a map poses no intellectual challenge. The remedy is either to educate oneself (e.g., to learn how to read the map) or to outsource some decisions (e.g., to use a GPS). It is the book's last, and the shortest, part which contains the contentious proposition that the interest of the experiencing self must have precedence over the interest of the remembering self (and, by analogy, perhaps also over the anticipating self). The proposition is tautological if one admits that memories constitute experiences, and is questionable otherwise. If one enjoys remembering stories, telling stories, and hearing stories, one may as well live in order to create stories. One aspires to a happy ending---however brief---for the same reason that one aspires to establish a possibility result, a proof of concept, a theorem, whose beneficiaries shall be anonymous future generations.

If from an individual's point of view it is ambiguous whether to favour the experiencing or the remembering self, one can appeal to the society's interest. The society may not care about the individual's experiencing self beyond that individual's own concern---in order to avoid double counting. By contrast, the society may doubly care about the individual's remembering self, whose stories may lend themselves to storage and communication better than readings off a hedonimeter do. Then, the remembering self must have precedence.